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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3156 
 ___________ 
 
 GUO ZUI ZHOU, 
        Petitioner 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A70-905-027) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald Vincent Ferlise 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 13, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  Guo Qin Zhuo, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, 
entered the United States in 1992.  In 1993, he filed an application for asylum and 
withholding of removal.  In 1997, the Government charged him with removability for 
entering the county without being inspected or admitted, which Zhou conceded.  The 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications for relief from removal in 2001, and the 
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Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Zhou’s subsequent appeal and 
affirmed the IJ’s decision on October 25, 2002.  At that point, Zhou’s order of removal 
became final; he did not appeal the BIA’s decision.   
  On May 21, 2007, Zhou filed his first motion to reopen with the BIA.  He 
sought to reopen proceedings so that he could adjust his status based on an approved I-
140 employment-based immigrant petition.  He relied on INA § 245(i) and Matter of 
Velarde, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253 (BIA 2002).  The BIA denied the motion on the basis that it 
had been untimely filed and also declined to reopen the proceedings sua sponte on the 
basis that eligibility or potential eligibility for relief after the elapse of the time period for 
filing a motion to reopen does not constitute “exceptional circumstances.”  Zhou 
petitioned for review.   
  We denied his petition.  See Zhou v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 
312 F. App’x 497 (3d Cir. 2009).  We held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Zhou’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than 90 days after 
the BIA’s final decision and no exception to that deadline applied.  See Zhou, 312 F. 
App’x at 499.  We also concluded that the BIA’s decision not to reopen Zhou’s case sua 
sponte was beyond the scope of our review.  See id.  We also rejected Zhou’s contention 
that the BIA did not sufficiently understand or discuss his claims.  See id. 
  Zhou returned to the BIA with a second motion to reopen on June 2, 2010.  
Again citing INA § 245(i) and Matter of Velarde, he again asked for reopening that he 
could adjust his status based on an approved I-140 employment-based immigrant petition.  
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He also argued that his was an exceptional case meriting sua sponte reopening.  The BIA 
denied the motion.  The BIA explained that Zhou’s filing was number-barred because it 
was his second motion to reopen and that the ordinary limit is one motion to reopen.  The 
BIA also ruled that Zhou had not shown an “exceptional situation” that would warrant 
sua sponte reopening. 
  Zhou presents another petition for review.  He argues that his motion to 
reopen was not time-barred.  He alludes to the availability of equitable tolling and argues 
that he presented an exceptional circumstance to the BIA that merited reopening based on 
his motion or sua sponte reopening because he is the beneficiary of an approved labor 
petition.  Zhou also contends that the BIA abused its discretion by ruling without 
showing that it had considered the evidence and equities of his case.   
 The Government argues that Zhou’s motion was both time- and number-barred 
and that Zhou does not even challenge the BIA’s holding that the motion was number-
barred.  The Government further contends that even if equitable tolling were available to 
circumvent the number bar, Zhou presents no basis for such tolling.  For these reasons, 
and on the ground that Zhou’s “exceptional circumstances” arguments to disregard the 
limitations on motions to reopen are without merit, the Government requests that we 
summarily deny Zhou’s petition.  The Government also asks us to dismiss the petition to 
the extent that Zhou challenges the BIA’s discretionary decision not to exercise its 
authority to reopen Zhou’s proceedings sua sponte.  The Government further notes that 
we rejected Zhou’s substantially similar previous petition for review.   
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  Generally, we have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  However, certain denials of discretionary relief are outside our 
purview of review, including the BIA’s decision to decline to exercise its discretion to 
reopen a case sua sponte.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 
320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Because the BIA retains unfettered discretion to 
decline to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding, this court is without 
jurisdiction to review a decision declining to exercise such discretion to reopen or 
reconsider the case.”)  Accordingly, to the extent that Zhou challenges the denial of 
discretionary sua sponte reopening, we do not have jurisdiction over his petition.   
  Nonetheless, even in cases involving a discretionary denial of sua sponte 
reopening, we retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law raised in 
a petition for review.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  For instance, we may review 
Zhou’s claim that the BIA abused its discretion by not showing that it considered the gist 
of his motion.  We conclude that the claim is without merit.  In this case, the BIA 
satisfied its requirement to show that it reviewed the record and understood Zhou’s 
claims; it was “not required to write an exegesis on every contention.”  See Sevoian v. 
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).   
  Ordinarily, we would also review the BIA’s conclusion that Zhou’s motion 
was number-barred.  However, Zhou waived review of the issue by not raising it in his 
brief.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005).  To the extent that he 
implicated it by arguing that he was entitled to equitable tolling, we conclude that a 
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challenge to the BIA’s holding is without merit.  Generally, an alien may file only one 
motion to reopen.  See 8 U. S. C. § 1229a( c)( 7)( A) (listing an exception not relevant 
here).  The motion to reopen was clearly Zhou’s second.  Perhaps the numerical limit is 
subject to equitable tolling.  See Luntungan v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 449 F. 
3d 551, 557 & n. 15 (3d Cir. 2006).  Even if it is, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 
rejecting Zhou’s general argument for tolling “in the interest of justice.”  See Seitzinger 
v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing guidance on 
when equitable tolling is appropriate).        
  Also, as we have noted elsewhere, we can review the BIA’s ruling on 
whether a petitioner has shown an “exceptional situation” or, stated otherwise, whether a 
petitioner has established a prima facie case for sua sponte relief.  See Cruz v. Attorney 
Gen. of the United States, 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2006).  We also have jurisdiction to 
consider whether the BIA is ignoring limits it has placed on its own discretion in denying 
sua sponte relief (by, for instance, holding that it will always grant that exceptional relief 
for a particular reason).  See id.  To the extent that Zhou is making this type of argument, 
we must reject it on the merits.  Unlike in Cruz, where there was evidence that the BIA 
was ignoring a general policy it had established, see 452 F. 3d at 246 n.3 & 249-50, there 
is no similar evidence in this case relating to allowing untimely or number-barred 
motions to reopen for potential adjustment of status.  Cf. Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 475.   
  For these reasons, and for essentially the same reasons as we denied Zhou’s 
previous petition (which raised substantially the same issues), we will deny Zhou’s 
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petition for review.  However, we deny the motion for summary disposition that the 
Government filed with its brief.  We grant the Government’s motion to dismiss the 
petition in part insomuch as we do not have jurisdiction over an appeal from a 
discretionary denial of sua sponte reopening, as we described above.     
 
